Introduction
Recent advances in comparative development have investigated the determinants and the influence of institutions. In order to understand the coexistence of change and persistence in institutional dynamics, a crucial distinction has been drawn between de jure and de facto sources of political power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008a,b) . De facto power is power that is not allocated by de jure institutions such as voting legislation or elections, but rather is possessed by a social group as a result of wealth, violence, or other means. In the context of the U.S. South during the Restoration de jure power took the form of suffrage restrictions, while de facto control reflected the inter-racial conflict between the white elites and the black descendants of slaves. The goal of this paper is to investigate empirically the relative strength of these alternative although interrelated sources of power. More specifically, we analyse the determinants of electoral outcomes such as voter registration and turnout, with special focus on their racial distribution, on the basis of previously unexploited data covering the counties of Mississippi at the end of the nineteenth century. These data represent a unique source of information on voter registration by race at the county level.
Between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century southern U.S. states introduced a series of procedures and laws aimed at disfranchising a large share of the population.
The majority of these laws took the form of poll taxes and literacy tests which prevented poor and illiterates from casting their vote. African Americans and poor whites were the main target of these rules. In fact, by ensuring their support to the Republican and to the Populist parties these groups represented a serious threat to the aspirations of the wealthy white landowners who were mainly represented by the Democratic party. In order to insulate the political system from these challenges to their hegemony, white Democrats introduced barriers to voting meant to exclude the majority of blacks and poor whites from the southern electorate.
The effectiveness of these procedures is still largely debated. While some scholars believe in an effective power of the disfranchisement schemes in restricting electorate suffrage (e.g., Kousser, perpetuated for long and the increasing abuse of power in public office led to the passage in State Constitutions of de jure procedures (Wharton, 1947) . This paper contributes to the above literature by providing evidence on the importance of de facto vs. de jure political power, that is, of race vs. suffrage, in the U.S. South. Mississippi represents an ideal starting point for such an investigation. In the past, it had one the highest proportion of slaves (52 percent in 1860, third after South Carolina and Louisiana) and in 2000 still had the highest proportion of blacks (37 percent if we exclude the District of Columbia with 60 percent). The state was one of the first to enact de jure disfranchisement provisions in 1890. Moreover, in economic terms, it has always been one of the most backward states of the U.S., with the lowest income per capita ($15,853) in 2000.
In November 1890 a new constitution replaced the Mississippi constitution of 1869. New qualifications for voters required that "each elector (1) Be a male citizen; (2) Be twenty-one years of age or over; (3) Be a resident of the State two years and of the election district or municipality one year; (4) Be registered to vote; (5) Be not disqualified by reason of insanity, idiocy, or conviction of certain crimes; (6) Be able to read any section of the State Constitution, or be able to understand it when read to him, or to a give reasonable interpretation of it; (7) Have paid all taxes
by February of the year in which he desires to vote and produce evidence of payment. This includes payment of an annual poll tax of two dollars." Therefore, in addition to longer residence requirements, the novelties introduced by the new constitution were a literacy test and a poll tax, both as prerequisites for registration. A complete re-registration was required before the first election following the 1 st of January 1892.
In order to conduct our analysis of the effect of the new constitution we use a previously unexploited source of official statistics for the state of Mississippi that we collected from the United
States v. Mississippi Interrogatory Answers. "The Interrogatory Answers collection is the result of a 1962 action brought by the "USA government against the State of Mississippi (…), alleging that the defendants had violated the voting rights of African American citizens. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the complaint, but the Supreme Court reversed the suit on appeal in March 1965. However, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 before the District Court reconsidered the case (…). The information outlined in the interrogatory answers provide detailed data and sources that illuminate the difficulties African Americans faced in
Mississippi when they attempted to exercise their right to vote between 1890 and 1963 ." (University of Mississippi Libraries, Digital Collections). In particular, the Interrogatory Answers contain cross-4 sectional county-level data on voter registration by race for the 1896 presidential election.
We merge this source with data on total voter turnout for presidential elections and we exploit the correlation between black registration and turnout in 1896 in order to reconstruct data on black registration in Mississippi at the end of the 19 th century. We compare the resulting estimates with those in Kousser (1974) and Redding and James (2001) and we use them in order to investigate the determinants of electoral outcomes. Next, in order to identify the causal effect of voting restrictions vs. racial factors, we compare results from a difference and difference approach with results from a cross-county regressions. We find that black registration in Mississippi declines after the de jure innovations of 1890 but is also strongly reduced in the presence of a larger black share. Finally, we also investigate whether voting restrictions ultimately matter in economic terms as predicted by distributive politics models. We find that political participation does influence both educational policies and economic inequality.
The main message emerging from our investigation can be summarized as follows: on the one hand, as argued by Kousser (1974) , we find a clear effect of the legislation on political outcomes; on the other, as maintained by Key (1949) , the process of black disfranchisement starts well before the introduction of the new constitution and disfranchisement is stronger in counties where a black majority represents a threat. Moreover, the effect of the black share becomes stronger after 1890, suggesting that the de jure barriers may have served the purpose of institutionalizing a de facto condition of disfranchisement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature. Section 3 presents results for the imputed estimates of black registration. Section 4 reports the difference in difference estimates. Section 5 contains the cross county evidence. Section 6 looks at education policies and inequality. Section 7 concludes and illustrates the relevance of our results for understanding the ongoing debate about electoral legislation and racial discrimination in the U.S.
Related literature
Earlier empirical contributions on the effects of suffrage restrictions in the U.S. South, including Kousser (1973 Kousser ( , 1974 and Redding and James (2001) , rely on ecological regressions in order to reconstruct the racial pattern of voter behavior during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century. As a response to the paucity of data organized by race, these techniques exploit the variation in the racial components of the eligible population, together with the available data on 5 overall turnout, to estimate registration, turnout and party shares for blacks and whites, either at a county or at a state level. While Kousser (1974) strongly rejects Key's (1949) fait accompli hypothesis, Redding and James (2001) acknowledge the cumulative influence of violence and intimidation against blacks, especially in the presence of a large black population.
More recent empirical contributions include Naidu (2012) , who examines the effect of voting restrictions over the 1870-1920 period. Using adjacent county-pairs of counties that straddle state boundaries, he finds that the introduction of poll taxes and/or literacy tests, captured jointly by a time-varying dummy variable, lowered overall voter turnout, increased the Democratic vote share, and reduced the teacher-child ratio in black schools. However, the potential role of competing factors such as race is not explicitly investigated. Chay and Munshi (2011) examine political participation in the U.S. South in the 1870-1890 period, that is during and just after Reconstruction, and find that the Republican vote share, which they interpret as a measure of black political mobilization, was larger in the presence of historical preconditions captured by the plantation share (i.e., the share of land allocated to the major plantation crops). In other words, during this historical period, which largely predates our main focus, a greater density of blacks allowed more social cohesion and promoted though this channel their political participation. A common feature with our findings is the prominent role of racial factors in determining electoral outcomes.
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A discussion on the relative relevance of de jure vs. de facto political power is contained in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008a,b) . However, their analysis is mainly theoretical and descriptive and focuses on an earlier historical period, immediately before and after the Civil War. Their general argument is that a change in political institutions that modifies the distribution of de jure power may be offset by a change in the distribution of de facto political power. In the context of the U.S. South, the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of blacks following the Civil War represented a huge change in the distribution of de jure power. Yet, the economic and political system changed very little if compared with the antebellum South, since the persistence of the de facto political power of the landed elites was able to compensate effectively for the loss of their de jure political power. The elites managed to keep control through the continuation of the plantation economy and through intimidation and violence. In the present paper, we empirically test the implications for this analysis over the Restoration.
There is also a related literature, including Welch (1973) , Margo (1982 Margo ( , 1990 , Smith (1984 , 1989 ), 6 Orazem (1987 , Pritchett (1989) , Fishback and Baskin (1991) , and Card and Krueger (1992) , on the effects of voting restrictions on the racial distribution of education outcomes, schooling segregation and employment discrimination. These contributions are a relevant term of comparison for our analysis of the effect of black registration on education policy and inequality.
Another stream of research has examined the removal of voting restrictions following the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The conclusions are that removal of restrictions increased black registration (Alt, 1994) , increased overall turnout and more strongly so in the presence of a larger black share (Filer, Kenny, and Morton, 1991) , increased welfare spending (Husted and Kenny, 1997) , shifted state aid toward localities with a larger black share (Cascio and Washington, 2012) , and increased political competition and growth-promoting policies (Besley, Persson, and Sturm, 2010) .
Finally, models of franchise extensions are proposed by Ades and Verdier (1996) , Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) , and Lizzeri and Persico (2004) , while Llavador and Oxoby (2005) and Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) offer theoretical motivations for landowners' opposition to democracy.
Preliminary Analysis: Revised Voter Registration Data
After the adoption of the new constitution in 1890, black political participation in Mississippi decreased sharply. Kousser (1974) The state of Mississippi has been one of the first U.S. states to enact disfranchisement schemes.
These schemes have often been considered responsible for the decline in turnout and the persistence of the Democrats' hegemony in the South. However, turnout in several southern U.S. states started its decrease well before the 1890s. This fall was associated with a sharp decline in black participation which started in the 1870s and was mainly attributable to the use of fraud, Rights, 1965: 2) . This downward trend has induced some academics (i.e., Key, 1949) to consider the enactment of disfranchisement schemes in the South ineffective because they simply consolidated a state of affairs which was already in place before their introduction. This position contrasts with a more institutional view which ascribes the decline in black registration directly to the effectiveness of voting restrictions. Using a series of ecological regressions, Kousser (1974) concludes that the largest share of the decrease in black registration in the South is to be attributed to the introduction of poll taxes and literacy tests which, for the state of Mississippi, reduced black registration to 5.4 percent in 1892. Redding and James (2001) also use similar ecological regressions and document a decline in the black turnout which by 1892 falls to 7.4 percent.
Ecological regressions have been quite popular in reconstructing racial voting patterns in the South of the U.S. Because data on shares of whites and blacks registered voters are not available, they exploit the variation in the number of white and black eligible voters together with data on the turnout in order to estimate the racial voting patterns. Despite the simplicity of the procedure, ecological regressions do not appear very robust since they are highly sensitive to spatial dependence, model specification, and therefore aggregation bias. As a result, they can lead to inconsistent conclusions: for example, for Mississippi Kousser (1974) estimates black registration in 1892 at 5.4 percent, while for the same year Redding and James (2001) estimate black turnout at 7.4 percent.
Given that the United States v. Mississippi Interrogatory Answers provide real data on black and white registration at the county level for the 1896 presidential election, we can use this valuable information in order to construct estimates in the proximity of the 1890s in order to have a consistent series which can then be compared with previous estimates. The only assumption which we make in order to reconstruct such a series is that total voter turnout is a linear function of black registration, so that we can consider the latter as an inverse function of total turnout. As result, we can use a simple imputation in order to estimate black registration for years for which we do not have data. The problem with the imputation is the potential for measurement bias and an improper distribution with biased variation across counties. However, the average registration should be unbiased given that the imputation exploits the variation in black registration and total turnout to 8 estimate the former for missing years. In addition, in the absence of other sources of electoral data by race for the period under investigation, this procedure represents the only feasible alternative to ecological regressions and can provides a term of comparison for the results in Kousser (1974) and Redding and James (2001) .
According to the Interrogatory Answers data, average black registration for the 1896 presidential elections across the counties of Mississippi is equal to 14.3 percent with a standard deviation of almost 13 percent. Table 1 reports the pairwise correlations between electoral outcomes for the 1896 presidential election. Data on black and white registration are from the Interrogatory Answers, while overall turnout and Democratic and republican party shares are provided by Clubb et al. (2006) . The correlation between black registration and total turnout is above 0.75. Moreover, the correlation between black registration and the other available figures is much lower, suggesting that it is the variation of turnout that matters most for the variation of black registration. The outcome of the imputation for the presidential elections in 1884, 1888 and 1892 is reported in Table 2 , which shows descriptive statistics for black registration in these years as well as the real data for the 1896. In 1884 black registration is almost 36 percent and declines to 32.5 percent in 1888. According to Kousser (1974, p. 144) black turnout in 1888 is close to 30 percent which seems consistent with our estimated 32.5 percent registration given that it is natural to expect partial defection. Registration decreases to less than 11 per cent in 1892. However, 1892 may be a sensitive year because it is the first election after the reform of the constitution and this can explain why the percentage in 1892 is even smaller than the actual figure of 14.3 percent reported by the Interrogatory Answers for 1896. Even though before 1890 there was already a downward trend in black registration, and even setting aside 1892 for the above-mentioned reasons, we find that between 1888 and 1896 there is a fall of over 18 percent. On the other hand, the latter figure is consistent with our 10.7 percent estimate for black registration. For 1896 Kousser (Table 2. 10 Given that we now have data on black registration before and after the introduction of the 1890 constitution we can use this data in order to estimate a difference in mean between the two time periods. Of course this procedure does not identify any casual effect since it does not take in consideration the long-run time trend. However, when compared with the difference in mean in total turnout it can provide useful insight on the overestimation of the effect of voting restrictions which we can obtain using turnout rather than black registration.
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The estimates are reported in Table 4 . In Model 1 we only control for a post-constitution dummy which is equal to one after 1890. Its coefficient indicates that the difference in mean in the registration of blacks before and after the new constitution is about 18 percent. In the next two models we also enter the share of black adult males 4 for the relevant years (Model 2) and its interaction with the post-constitution dummy (Model 3). While the interaction is not significant in Model 3, the share of eligible black males is highly significant and decreases registration by almost one third per a one percent increase in the share of blacks. In other words, black registration declines after the de jure innovations of 1890 but is also strongly reduced in the presence of a larger black share.
In the next three models we repeat the same exercise using data on turnout to spot possible difference in the estimated effect of the post-constitution dummy. Estimates for turnout are very similar to the ones for registration even though using the former tends to over-estimate the effect of the post-constitution dummy by an average 3 percent. Of course, if disfranchisement schemes were effective, this is likely to be due to a fall in the white electorate. 
The Impact of Voting Restrictions in Mississippi
The problem with the estimates in the previous section is that they do not provide a clear causal effect because of the absence of a control group. However, given the correlation between turnout and black registration we can use the former over the 1876-1900 period in order to establish a causal effect of the voting requirements introduced in the 1890 constitution. In doing so we need to keep in mind that, under the assumption that the post-constitution dummy in the turnout and black registration regressions is correlated with the same unobservable variables there may be an average 3 percent of whites which is also disenfranchised.
Our identification strategy is based on a simple difference in difference in which we compare
Mississippi turnout before and after 1890 using an appropriate control group which over the same time period did not pass any bill to restrict the electorate. The timeline of the introduction of poll taxes and literacy tests in all southern states is reported in Kousser (1974 , Table 9 .1). * Virginia had a poll tax also before 1881. Table 6 reports In Figure 1 An essential assumption behind the difference in difference estimator is the exogeneity of the treatment (i.e., there should be no reasons why states which had lower turnout enacted disfranchisement schemes sooner). The endogeneity of the treatment is always a potential problem and if we take Key's argument seriously then we should expect some possible endogeneity. This endogeneity bias is likely to over-estimate the effect of disfranchisement schemes. However, the fact that turnout in Alabama is not really different from the one in Mississippi and the fact that also states in which the trend in turnout was increasing enacted those schemes (Texas and North Carolina) seem to suggest that turnout should not have any effect on the enactment of voting restrictions. The fact that the timing of the introduction of the schemes across states is independent of turnout is also confirmed by additional inspection. Virginia which first introduced a poll tax in 1876 (and then abolished in 1881) had in the same year a turnout close to 71 percent. Turnout in Georgia and Tennessee in the election before the introduction of the schemes (1876 and 1888 respectively) was 63.3 and 79.3 percent. Overall the timing of the introduction of the schemes appears to depend more on de facto power, political will, social conditions, and influences of the central government so that it is exogenous with respect to turnout.
In more detail, the model we estimate to test the possible causal effect of the 1890 constitutional reform can be written as: Table 7 shows county-level estimates for the 1876-1900 period using counties of Alabama as a control group. In Model 1 we pool congressional and presidential elections together and the postconstitution dummy which should capture the effect of the reform in Mississippi in not significant.
The effect of the share of black adult males is to decrease turnout by almost 0.34 percent per a one percent change in the share. In addition the significant effect of turnout (t -1) suggests persistence in turnout: on average there is an increase in turnout of 0.40 percent per a one percent higher turnout in the previous election. In Model 2 we confine the estimates to presidential elections only.
The 1890 constitutional reform now decreases turnout by an average 9 percent even though the effect is marginally significant. The interaction between blacks and the post-1890 dummy is also significantly reinforcing the negative effect of the share of blacks after 1890. Before 1890 a one percent change in the share of blacks decreases turnout by an average 0.43 percent, compared to an average 0.58 percent after 1890. In Model 3 we only look at congressional elections and we find that the effect of the reform has no statistical significant effect, while the share of blacks and the interaction between blacks and the post-1890 dummy remain significant. However, differently from presidential election the racial effect diminishes after 1890.
Results in Table 7 therefore suggest that the effect of the restrictions to vote in Mississippi may have had only a marginal effect on presidential elections and that the decrease in turnout is more likely to depend on a long term trend which initiated after the 1876 election. In addition it seems that de facto factors of disfranchisement, such as race, may have been the main reasons of turnout reduction. The effect of race became even more binding after 1890 which suggests that the main effect of constitutional reforms may have been though the institutionalization of de facto disfranchisement. 
Cross County Analysis
So far we have shown that between the pre-1890 and the post-1890 period there has been a decline in black registration of almost 18 percent and that this decline is marginally imputable to a direct effect of the disfranchisement schemes, since the main effect of these schemes runs through a sort of institutionalization of de facto disfranchisement. In this section we use the data on registration by race for the 1896 presidential election in Mississippi collected from the Interrogatory Answers to test whether such a conclusion is confirmed by a simple cross county analysis. We exploit the cross county variation in the proportion of registered votes by race in 1896 to test whether registration varies with proxies for the level of literacy and wealth of blacks which should capture the effectiveness of the literacy test and the poll tax. If the de jure innovations introduced by the 1890 constitution were such to influence electoral outcomes, we should expect the difference in black registration to depend strongly on the cross county variation in these variables. At the same time, we can gauge how registration responds to de facto elements, as captured by the share of blacks and measures of the power of the landed elites. If the variation in black registration is determined by de jure constraints, once we control for them de facto elements should not display any explanatory power.
Our first set of regressors includes proxies for the de jure constraints which reflect the two innovations introduced by the 1890 constitution, i.e., the literacy test and the poll tax. Of course, these requirements were imposed on all residents of the state of Mississippi. However, their practical relevance should vary with illiteracy and with the ability to pay, which in turn differ between races and across counties. Thus, we employ the illiteracy rate per race as an indicator of the impact of the literacy test. In particular, counties associated with higher shares of illiterate blacks should exhibit lower registration. To proxy for blacks' wealth, and therefore for the impact of the poll tax, 5 we use three variables: sharecropping intensity, black migration, and black infant mortality. Sharecropping intensity should reflect cash flow availability. Consequently, the poll tax should be more effective in counties where the population has tighter cash flow (see Kousser, 1974) , so that we should expect a negative association between sharecropper intensity and registration. Consistently with migration theory, 6 we expect blacks to leave those counties where their wage is lower. Thus, we should observe a negative correlation between migration and registration. Infant mortality is in turn influenced by diseases and malnutrition and is therefore closely associated with low income levels, 8 so that we should expect a negative correlation with registration. To sum up, we interpret illiteracy, sharecropping intensity, migration, and infant mortality as variables capturing the effectiveness of the de jure determinants of voter registration.
Our main de facto determinant of voter registration is race, as measured by the share of black adult males over total population. The use of the black adult male share as a proxy for de facto disfranchisement is consistent with the literature in the field (Kousser, 1974; Key, 1949; and Ogden, 1958) . The opposition to black registration was tougher in counties where blacks represented the majority. For example Wharton (1947) reports that, except in counties where the Democrats had a safe majority, blacks were strenuously pressured to refrain from voting, or even to vote the Democratic ticket, both through economic means (such as threats of unemployment) and other cooptative or intimidative practices. In their regression analysis of voter behavior, Redding and James (2001) also employ black population as a proxy for a host of factors aimed at discouraging 5 In Mississippi the tax was cumulative, with a maximum total charge of four dollars: For the bottom three quarters of the southern population 1890 per capita income (including non-cash components) was estimated by Kousser (1974) at about 64 dollars. 6 See Harris and Todaro (1970) . 7 See Irwin and O'Brien (2001) for migration patterns in the Mississippi-Yazoo Delta in 1880-1910. 8 See the Report on Vital Statistics in the 1880 and 1890 census. 18 black political participation. We also control for land inequality and for the share of urban population. Both controls should capture the relative influence of the land-owning white elite, whose presence may represent another de facto impediment to black political participation (as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008a ).
In Table 8 we report descriptive statistics for the state of Mississippi at the turn of the century. In 1896 black registration 9 is less than one fifth of white registration: 10 the cross county average share of black adult males who register in 1896 is about 14 percent against almost 73 percent for whites.
11
In socio-economic terms, Mississippi is a striking image of the South in this time period. With a 51.8 percent of blacks over total population in 1890, it ranks third after South Carolina and Louisiana. The black share increases by almost 0.2 percent in the 1860-1890 period, since the slave share in 1860 is equal to 51.6 percent.
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We also calculate a proxy for black migration which is equal to the difference between black population in 1890 and black population in 1880, the latter augmented by the difference between birth and death rates in 1880 and 1890. From census data 13 we know that the annual rate of birth among blacks is 3.1 percent and the annual rate of death is 1.5 percent.
14 Using this measure we estimate an average migration rate in 1880-90 of 1 percent, with a peak of 44 percent in Quitman.
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Next we report statistics for other controls, starting with the black adult male share, which varies widely across counties following the pattern of the black share.
Black illiteracy, i.e., the share of illiterate black adult males, is much larger than that for whites (52 percent against 8 percent).
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The index of sharecropping intensity 17 is on average almost 30 percent of total farm population, with the highest share in Issaquena (over 80 percent). The infant mortality rate for blacks in 1890, measured as the rate of death in black population under one year of age, is on average 8.5 percent, with a maximum at 21.3 percent in Clay and a minimum at 1.97 percent in 9 Black registration is equal to the ratio of the number of registered blacks in 1896 to black male population of age 21 and above in 1900 (the closest available year as in Kousser, 1974) . We proceed in a similar fashion for white registration. See also footnote 4. 10 The total number of registered blacks and whites is 16,234 and 108,998 respectively. These figures are consistent with totals provided by the Biennial Report of Secretary of State to Legislature of Mississippi for 1896-1897. 11 The maximal white registration is above 100 percent because of frauds, which at the time were common in the South. For example Kousser (1974, p. 49) reports that white registration in Louisiana in 1897 is 103.2 percent. 12 In 1860, there were fewer than 1,000 free people of colour. 13 The birth and death rates for 1880-90 are provided by the Report on Vital Statistics of the 1890 census. 14 The number of blacks in Mississippi in the 1890 census is 742,559. However, if we augment the 1880 number of blacks by taking into account birth and death rates, we obtain an estimated number of blacks in 1890 of 747,835. We impute this difference to migration outside the state. 15 If we take the difference between the share of blacks (including slaves and free coloured) in 1860 and the share of blacks in 1890 for the 60 counties that exist in 1860 we find that the increase in the share of blacks is 0.7 percent, which is larger than what previously reported in the text because of the creation of new counties from lands of pre-existing counties in the 1860s and the 1870s. We introduce our estimate of migration because of the lack of comparability between the counties in place in 1860 and 1890. 16 We use data on the share of illiterates in 1900 because figures for the adult population are available only for this year. 17 The index of sharecropping intensity is calculated as the ratio of farm population under a sharecropping scheme to total farm population. The index is equal to one if all farm population is under a sharecropping scheme.
Jasper. Land inequality 18 and the share of urban population (both as of 1890) also vary significantly. The descriptive statistics in Table 8 already provide some preliminary evidence about the importance of race as a disfranchisement factor. If we compare the maximal and minimal registration for blacks across counties, we find that registration is highest in Smith (53.8 percent of black adult males), where the share of blacks in only 16 percent and the share of black adult males is similarly low at 6.6 percent, and therefore not large enough to represent a credible threat to white Democrats. At the other extreme we find Noxubee where black registration is equal to 0.7 percent against a share of blacks and of black adult males of 82.7 and 31.2 percent, respectively. The fact that blacks in this county represented a large majority suggests that tougher opposition was necessary in order to keep a white hegemony, as explained by Wharton (1947) . At the same time, the difference in registration between these two counties is hardly explained in terms of literacy tests and poll taxes, since large variations in illiteracy and wealth are absent (black illiteracy in Smith is 54 percent and in Noxubee 66 percent, i.e., both above the mean).
In Table 9 we regress variables for white and black registration on our de jure and de facto controls.
In Model 1 we start with a basic model of black registration in which we only include de jure controls, i.e., black illiteracy for the effect of the literacy test and sharecropping intensity, black 18 To compute land inequality we use the Generalized Entropy Index (a=-1).
20 migration, and black infant mortality for the effect of the poll tax. The only significant proxy is sharecropping intensity: its negative coefficient confirms the hypothesis that counties where cash availability is lower should exhibit lower black registration. While the signs of the coefficients of the other proxies always point to the expected direction, none of them is significant.
In Model 2 we add our main control for de facto power, i.e., the share of black adult males. The effect of race turns to be significant at a 1 percent level, with a decrease in registration of 1.11 per a one percent increase in the black adult male share.
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At the same time, the coefficient of sharecropping intensity turns positive and barely significant at a 10 percent level, while black migration is associated with higher registration. Similar results (which we do not report for brevity)
are be obtained by replacing the black adult male share with the slave share in 1860. The correlation between the two variables is 0.95 but using the latter would reduce the sample to only 60
observations.
In Model 3 we enter two proxies for the de facto power of white elites, land inequality and the urban density. The former does display a significantly negative effect on black registration with a reduction of black registration by almost 0.05 per a standard deviation, while the latter is not significant. Nevertheless, the effect of race as captured by the black adult male share is hardly diminished, while sharecropping intensity is no longer significant and migration remains so only at a 5 percent level.
Finally in Model 4 to control for omitted variables bias we also include a set of geographical variables (see Table 8 for summary statistics). Namely, we include a dummy for Jackson, the state capital, because in this county Republicans had a strong organization. We also control for distance from Jackson (both in latitude and longitude). A dummy for counties on the Mississippi River Delta is meant to capture its particular characteristics (agricultural plains with the largest black shares and land inequality).
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The Jackson dummy exerts a positive but marginally significant influence, while the longitudinal distance from the capital decrease black registration. Apart from that, the de facto proxies for race and land inequality are now the only significant regressors, while proxies for de jure constraints never seems to matter. Overall, the R-squareds (between 0.47 and 0.55 in the three models including the black adult male share) imply that these models can explain a large portion of the variation in black registration, consistently with the idea that blacks were more severely deprived of political power in counties where the share of blacks was larger. On the other hand the effect of factors proxying for the poll tax and the literacy test add no robust explanatory power to our models when race is accounted for.
In other words, de facto disfranchisement as captured by race prevails over de jure disfranchisement 22 as an explanation of black registration. The effect of land inequality is also significant and negative, which suggests that the opposition to blacks' enfranchisement was tougher in counties in which whites represented a strong elite.
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In Model 5 we replace black registration with white registration as the dependent variable and we find that land inequality exerts a significant negative effect (significant at a 10 percent level) also on white registration. A standard deviation in land inequality decreases white registration by almost 0.07 percent, suggesting that poor whites may also have been affected by the presence of white elites. The Jackson dummy and urban density are the only other significant variables. This lack of significance is likely to be explained by the large proportion of registered whites, close on average to 73 percent and therefore in line with turnout in a full democracy. It is plausible therefore that restrictions introduced with the 1890 constitutions had no effect on the white electorate, as confirmed by the insignificance of the coefficient of white illiteracy.
Since voting and registration may follow spatial patterns (Darmofal, 2006) , in Table 10 we repeat the same exercise of Table 9 controlling for spatial correlation across counties, to obtain very similar results. Sharecropping intensity is still significant at a 1 percent level in Model 1, but consistently with simple OLS the variable loses significance in the following models. Land inequality confirms its negative and significant coefficient and the effect of the other controls, starting with that of race, is similar to what emerged from Table 9 . 22 Results in Table 10 are directly comparable with the difference in difference estimates presented in the previous section, where we used turnout as the dependent variable. Both the cross county analysis and the difference in difference approach suggest a marginal and non-robust effect of poll taxes and literacy tests on black registration and voting behavior. On the other hand there is evidence of a strong effect of race, which may have been used as a signalling device. Given that the easiest way to ensure a Democratic victory in the election was to exclude potential voter for Republicans, and given that blacks were likely to vote Republican, race was the simplest characteristic which revealed voting preferences. To sum up, our results imply that the formal legal institutions introduced with the Restoration were associated with a decrease in black political participation but they did not alter the balance of political power and rather formalized a status quo produced by other factors reflecting the de facto power of the white elite. Their introduction can be justified as an effort to substitute legal for extorted political control and to ensure the maintenance of white supremacy even in the face of 5,929.25 black children of school age, while the number of white teachers is 86.5 for 4,325.5 white children. In order to understand whether this difference is the effect of de jure disfranchisement, or else of race, in Model 1 we regress black teachers per black pupil on the black adult male share in 1910 and black and white registration in 1896. We also enter controls for the historical values of black illiteracy, land inequality, and the urban share, plus the geographical dummies. The number of black teachers per black pupil significantly increases with black registration and decreases with land inequality. At the mean a one percent change in the black registration increases the ratio of teachers to pupils by almost 0.018 which means that the number of teachers increases by almost two teachers per a hundred students.
In Model 2 we look at the ratio of white teachers per white pupils and consistently with Margo (1990) we find that the number of white teachers increases with the share of blacks while voting does not significantly affect white educational inputs. The positive effect of the share of blacks on white teachers occurs because counties used to divert state funds, which were allocated on a per child basis, from blacks to whites. For example in 1939-40 Sunflower county received for education from the state of Mississippi a total of $73,626, computed on a per child basis. Since 79 percent of the children of school age were black, the amount the county received for black pupils was $58.165.
However, only $35.564 was spent for black pupils. The remaining $22.601 was presumably spent on additional schooling for whites. As a result, the amount spent per white pupil was much larger in counties with a higher share of blacks.
Another way to assess the economic impact of voting restrictions is to measure their effect on inequality, which we can proxy for this time period using land inequality (as in Nunn, 2008) . In Table 13 we show a significant effect of the variation in voter registration on the Gini index of farms distribution in 1910. This measure of land inequality also increases with its initial level and with white registration, while it decreases with black registration. The share of white adult males, which is used to proxy for the number of potential owners, is not significant, while the share of the urban population is marginally significant.
To conclude, our results show that political participation matters both for educational policies and inequality, since lower black registration is significantly correlated with lower resources for blacks and higher inequality. 
Conclusion
With the aid of previously unexploited information on voter registration in 1896 Mississippi, we have investigated the effects of the voting restrictions introduced in the U.S. South between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century and shed light on their actual effectiveness.
First, by exploiting the correlation between black registration and total turnout, we employ the 1896 data to impute estimates of black registration before and after the enactment of the 1890 state constitution. We show that black registration in Mississippi declines after the de jure innovations of 29 1890 but that it is also strongly affected by de facto racial factors captured by the share of blacks.
Next, in order to establish a causal effect, we apply a difference in difference approach that indicates a marginal effect of voting restrictions and again a strong influence of race. The fact that the effect of race becomes even stronger after 1890 suggests that the de jure barriers may have served the purpose of institutionalizing a de facto condition of disfranchisement. Further cross county evidence confirms that de facto disfranchisement as captured by race prevails over de jure disfranchisement as an explanation of the observed pattern of black political participation. Finally we provide evidence of an influence of political participation on education policy and inequality.
Our findings contribute not only to the literature on the socio-political history of the Restoration in the U.S. South, but also to a broader current research line on the comparative relevance of de jure and de facto sources of power. The main message of the paper is that the de facto power of the southern white elites prevailed on the voting legislation as a determinant of black political participation. This finding helps to understand why, almost fifty years after the Voting Rights Act, enough "vestiges of discrimination" remain despite the removal of "first generation barriers". This is the motivation for the decision taken by Congress in 2009 to confirm until 2031 the preclearance provision, that is the section of the Act that requires jurisdictions that used poll taxes and literacy tests to obtain federal approval for any changes to their election practices, such as redistricting (The Economist, 2011) . In other words, as voting restrictions were not the main driver of black disfranchisement during the Restoration, their de jure reversal was not enough to end racial discrimination.
